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ABSTRACT
Merger Returns and the Form of Financing
This study investigates the effects of form of financing and size on
bidder and target stock return in mergers. The results demonstrate that the
form of merger financing affects the market's reaction to a merger
announcement. The bidding firm's returns are positive for cash bids and
negative and significantly smaller for equity financed bids. This is
consistent with recent findings that equity financings have a negative
announcement effect on stock prices. A merger's size is also important in
explaining stock returns and the size effect is related to the form of
financing. In addition, differences between mergers initiated with a tender
offer and those without a tender offer disappear once the form of financing
is considered. Finally, after correcting for equity financing effects, the
total returns to mergers are overwhelmingly positive. These findings strongly
suggest that two pieces of valuable information are simultaneously released
during a merger bid: the value of the merger as an investment and the
decision by the bidder on how to finance this investment. The results also
suggest that, absent the negative effects of equity financing, mergers are
positive net present value investments.
1Merger Returns and the Form of Financing
1. Introduction
Empirical research on the division of stock market gains from mergers
have been a mainstay of the financial economics literature for almost two
decades [see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter
(1988) for reviews]. While these studies have consistently documented that
the target firms' shareholders realize large gains in successful merger bids,
the results for bidding firms returns have been mixed. While most studies
document small, statistically insignificant positive returns to bidding
firms, Dodd (1980) and Malatesta (1983), find the bidding firms have small,
statistically significant negative returns at the announcement of a merger
bid. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) also find that after passage of the
William Act, bidders in tender offers lose. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter
(1988) summarize the findings on bidding firms as follows: "Acquirers,
however, receive at best modest increases in their stock price, and winners
of bidding contests suffer stock price declines as often as they do gains."
This does not differ substantially from Jensen and Ruback's (1983) earlier
conclusion that "The evidence suggests, however, that returns to successful
bidding firms in mergers are zero."
These conclusions are disconcerting since they seemingly provide no
profit maximization motivation for the management of bidding firms to pursue
acquisitions. Roll (1986) hypothesizes that managers of bidding firms overpay
for targets since they overestimate their ability to profitably run them.
Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1990) argue further that managerial objectives
other than profit maximization may motivate takeovers. They also present
2evidence that bidding firms with bad managers (ie. managers of firms that
perform poorly relative to their respective industries) do worse in takeovers
than bidding firms with good managers.
Other studies, however, challenge the view that successful bidding firms
do not profit in mergers. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Schipper
and Thompson (1983) argue that returns to bidding firms may not be accurately
measured in other studies and both present evidence supporting their
arguments. Measurement problems may arise because of the relative sizes of
bidders and target firms or because the stock market has already capitalized
expectations about future merger bids into the bidding firm's stock price
prior to any announced merger.
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) argue that the relative sizes of
bidding and target firms may mask the gains to the bidding firm. The
absolute gain associated with the acquisition of a small target firm by a
large bidder may only produce a small abnormal return. For example, if the
gain accruing to the bidding firm is 5% of the target firm's equity value and
if the bidder's equity value is ten times that of the target, only a 0.5%
abnormal return will be observed. Testing for this they find that merger
benefits, as measured by excess returns, are more observable when targets are
large relative to bidders. Regression analysis reveals that the size of the
bidding firm's abnormal return is positively and statistically significantly
related to the relative size of the target firm relative to the bidder.
Moreover, returns to the bidding firm's shareholders may not be measured
properly if the net present value of future mergers has already been
capitalized into the bidding firm's stock price before the mergers are
announced. Schipper and Thompson (1983) found evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. They report significantly positive abnormal returns at the
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3announcement of acquisitions programs which are unrelated to specific merger
bids. This evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that bidding
firms' shareholders gain from merger.1
Other factors may prevent the returns to the bidding firms in a merger
from accurately reflecting the value of the merger. One such factor is how
the bidding firm finances the merger. Recent research shows that external
financing affects firm values, and the impact differs according to the type
of security issued (see Smith (1986) for a review). Consequently, the form
of merger financing may have an impact on the bidding firm's share price
independent of the investment value of the merger. Most event studies
attempt to correct for other announcements and contemporaneous information to
isolate the effects of a common event, such as a merger. All merger
announcements simultaneously release information concerning an investment
decision (i.e. the firm to be acquired and the price to be paid) and a
financing decision (i.e. where the acquisition price is to come from). If
information on two decisions is released simultaneously, it is difficult to
determine their separate impact. This is true of any investment decision
when the market must analyze the source of financing and any financing
decision where the market must interpret how the funds will be used.
Several studies have examined announcement returns in mergers by type of
financing. Huang and Walkling (1986) find that target firms have
significantly larger positive abnormal returns with cash mergers than with
stock offers. Travlos (1987) investigates this issue for bidder firms and
finds that stockholders earn significant abnormal losses at merger
announcements if equity financing is used and abnormal returns
insignificantly different from zero if cash is used. Franks, Harris, and
Mayer (1988) investigate means of payment to both bidders and targets using
4monthly data and find that U.S. bidding firms suffer abnormal losses when
using equity as the means of payment.2
None of these studies, however, adjusts for relative size, which
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) show is related to excess returns. These
studies also do not combine bidder and target returns to see if there is a
net total gain from mergers. If there are no real synergies from merger,
combined gains should be zero at best. The division of these gains may not be
symmetric, however. For example, simple overpayment should transfer value
from the bidder to the target with no change in the total value. Poor bidder
management may actually result in a net loss for the combined returns. If
real synergies exist (either operating or managerial) total gains should be
positive, absent any measurement effects due to size or financing.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of both the
size and the form of financing on merger returns for both bidder and target
firms. Market effects are measured with daily excess returns and also with
daily excess dollar returns. This second metric is the excess dollar change
in value for a firm. Since it is measured in dollars, excess dollar returns
allow a direct comparison of the gains to bidders and targets of unequal
sizes. It also allows for a measure of total gains from the merger
announcement when the bidder and target excess dollar returns are summed.
The findings confirm that the returns to both bidders and targets differ
by form of merger financing and by the size of the merger. Compared with cash
financing, equity financing is associated with significantly smaller excess
returns and smaller excess dollar changes for both bidders and targets. The
finding for bidders is consistent with a negative impact of equity issues and
the findings for targets are consistent with investor tax advantages
associated with stock mergers. Regression analysis documents that the size of
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5equity financing is negatively related to bidder and target returns in
mergers.
The sample of merger bids is also divided into those initiated with a
tender offer and those initiated other ways, e.g. merger offers,
negotiations, open market purchases, etc. Early empirical evidence (see
Jensen and Ruback (1983)) shows that while target firm shareholders receive
large statistically significant gains regardless of the form of acquisition,
bidding firm shareholders do not. The measured returns to bidding firms have
been small and either insignificantly positive or significantly negative in
merger bids, while the returns to bidding firms in successful tender offers
have been small but significantly positive. Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988)
as well as Travlos (1987) show that this difference disappears in cash
financed merger bids. The findings here demonstrate that result and also show
that target returns are lower in tender offers than in mergers once form of
financing is controlled for.
Finally, the excess dollar retruns are summed for bidder and targers to
obtain a total return for each merger. The average total excess dollar return
is positive and the percentage of mergers with positive total excess dollar
return is significant for all categories of financing except those involving
common stock. Regression analysis further shows that total returns are
negatively related to the size of equity financing and positively related to
the size of cash financing.
All of the above results have important implications for the measurement
of merger gains and for the question of whether mergers create value. If a
merger announcement provides information on both the investment value of the
merger and on the proper valuation of the bidder's stock, then both pieces
must be considered when evaluating the value of, motivation for, and
6desirability of any merger. In total, the results presented here are
consistent with a positive investment value for mergers and a negative
financing effect associated with using equity.
2. Hypotheses
Consistent with the recent literature, the financing decision component
of a merger announcement may affect the returns to bidding firms. While the
announced method of financing a merger is not always the method used, it is
the usual method. When it isn't, it is still the predominant source of funds.
Recent studies have consistently reported the finding that equity issues
reduce firm value while other security issues have little or no effect (see
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Eckbo (1986), Masulis and Kowar (1986), and
Mikkelson and Partch (1986)). The rationale given is that the firm's decision
to issue equity constitutes a negative signal about its future prospects.
Mergers financed with common stock are both equity issues as well as
investments. If the market responds to equity merger financings in a manner
similar to its response to equity issues, stock financed mergers should
produce smaller bidder returns compared with bids financed with other means.
Hypothesis 1: Bidding firm equity financing effect - If a stock
merger is announced, (i.e. a merger in which the bidding firm issues
equity to the target firm shareholders), the bidding firm will have a
smaller excess return and excess dollar return on the announcement day
than if another form of financing is used.
On the other hand, the market reaction to cash financed mergers should
be free of the negative impact of equity financing and, therefore cash
mergers may provide a clearer view of the investment value of mergers to
bidding firms.3
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7Reasons other than a signal attached to equity issues may help to
explain this result. For example, there may be a systematic relationship
between investment value and form of financing. Bidders may choose to finance
good mergers with cash and poor ones with equity. They would thus keep all
the upside in good mergers while sharing the downside in poor ones. Hansen
(1988) argues the opposite view, the target will prefer equity if it is
undervalued so that it may share in the forthcoming gains. Fishman (1989)
argues that cash may be used to deter competing offers when acquisitions are
presumed profitable. Also, in a related argument, if the bidder's management
have a large equity position they may choose cash to protect their percentage
in the surviving firm. If there is, in addition, a positive correlation
between bidder management ownership and the quality of acquisition, merger
returns will be smaller with equity financing. All of these alternative
hypotheses do not deny that the form of financing matters, or that it is a
signal, they only differ in what the form of financing signals.
Another factor which provides insight into bidders' excess returns and
excess dollar returns is the relative size of the target and bidding firm.
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) find that the larger the merger (i.e. the
larger the target relative to the bidder), ceteris paribus, the larger and
more positive the bidder's excess return. They argue that this suggests
mergers are positive net present value investment decisions but that it is
difficult for the excess returns methodology to measure the value of small
targets to large bidders. In contrast, the literature on equity financing
documents a negative size effect for equity issues. Asquith and Mullins
(1986) find that larger equity financings result in larger negative excess
returns for issuing firms, presumably due to a stronger negative information
signal. Of course, large mergers financed with common stock are also large
8equity issues. Thus, just as there is a problem separating the investment
and financing components of a merger bid, there is a similar problem in
determining the effect of size on bidder's returns.
Two of the most plausible hypotheses concerning the size effect are:
Hyvothesis 2a: Positive size effect independent of form of financing -
Larger mergers are associated with larger positive excess returns and
larger positive excess dollar returns to bidders regardless of the form
of financing.
Hyvothesis 2b: Interaction of size effect and form of financing - Larger
cash bids are associated with larger positive excess returns and excess
dollar returns for bidders and larger common stock bids are associated
with larger negative bidder returns.
Support for Hypothesis 2a, which postulates a positive size effect
independent of the form of financing, suggests that mergers are positive net
present value investments, and that this value is more easily observed using
the excess returns methodology when the target is large relative to the
bidder. In this case, the investment value of mergers dominates any negative
size effect associated with equity financing. Support for the alternative,
a negative size effect regardless of the form of financing, suggests that
mergers are poor investment decisions. With the excess returns methodology
the loss of value would be more visible for large mergers, even with cash
mergers where the possible negative effect of equity financing is absent.
Hypothesis 2b suggests an interaction of form of financing and merger
size with a positive size effect with cash financing and a negative size
effect for common stock. Findings consistent with this hypothesis would
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9suggest that mergers are positive net present value investment decisions.
However, the investment value to bidders is more visible in the excess
returns and excess dollar returns of large cash mergers where there are no
negative financing effects. In the case of mergers financed with common
stock, the negative size effect associated with an equity financing decision
counteracts the investment value size effect visible in cash mergers.
Form of financing may also affect the return to target firms. The most
common explanation concerns investor taxes. When target investors sell their
shares for cash, they immediately realize any applicable capital gains and
must pay a capital gains tax. If selling shareholders receive the bidder's
common stock in exchange for their target shares, no capital gains are
realized immediately and no taxes are due. Capital gains are realized and
taxes due only if and when the target shareholder sells the bidder's shares
received in the merger transaction. 4
Thus, common stock financing allows target shareholders to postpone
capital gains taxes, while a cash merger immediately imposes on target
shareholders any capital gains taxes. The implication often made is that a
cash merger requires a higher merger price and thus higher returns (before
investor taxes) to the target because it is an immediately taxable
transaction. Because of the savings associated with postponing these taxes,
target shareholders are willing to accept a lower price and lower target
returns for common stock financed mergers.
The third hypothesis formalizes this rationale.
Hypothesis : Target firm equity financing effect - If a stock merger is
announced, the target firm will have a smaller positive return on
announcement day than if another (taxable) form of financing is used.
10
It is worth noting that there is an opposing hypothesis that suggests
higher returns to targets in stock mergers. Risk arbitrageurs, investment
specialists in the business of speculating on merger bids, experience no
differential tax treatment on cash versus stock mergers. For reasons related
to liquidity, transaction costs, and speed with which payment is received,
they prefer cash mergers to those financed with common stock and other
securities. As investors in the target firm, arbitrageurs require higher
prices and thus, higher target returns for equity financed mergers to offset
the cost and price risk implicit in the delay in receiving bidders' stock and
to compensate them for the transactions cost and possible liquidity effects
when they sell the shares received in the merger. If arbitrageurs are
dominant among target shareholders, we should observe higher target returns
for mergers financed with common stock and other securities and lower target
returns for cash financed mergers.
Tests of Hypothesis 3 should provide insight into the validity of the
investor tax rationale and the opposing argument based upon the preferences
of risk arbitrageurs.
In addition, this study explores the alternative techniques employed to
initiate merger bids - tender offers and merger offers. A merger offer is a
proposal by the bidder to merge with the target which is voted on by target
shareholders. Merger offers are negotiated directly with target management
and approved by the target's board of directors before going to a vote of
target shareholders for approval. In a tender offer, the bidding firm makes
an offer directly to target shareholders to purchase their shares. To effect
a merger, the tender is followed by a merger offer which is voted on by
target shareholders. Of course, when this vote is taken, the bidder already
owns a significant fraction (often a majority) of target shares purchased in
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the tender offer.
Early studies, summarized in Jensen and Ruback (1983), found differences
in the excess returns associated with successful tender offers and merger
offers. Compared with merger offers, tender offers produce larger average
excess returns for both bidding and target firms. However, consistent with
Hypotheses 1 and 3, this would be expected if tender offers are most often
financed with cash and if merger offers are more often financed with common
stock. Since this is generally thought to be the case, this study explores
the hypothesis that form of financing accounts for the differences in excess
returns observed by tender offers and merger offers.
Hypothesis 4: Form of merger financing and technique used to initiate
merger bids - For similar forms of financing, there is no difference
between the returns associated with tender offers and those associated
with merger offers.
This hypothesis suggests that the differences observed in excess returns for
tender offers and merger offers can be explained by the form of merger
financing, and the hypothesis applies to both bidder and target returns.
3. Data
This study analyzes a sample of 343 completed mergers where both the
target and bidding firms were listed on either the NYSE or ASE at the time of
the merger, and where the merger announcement was reported in the Wall Street
Journal. The set of mergers was chosen by examining the CRSP daily master
file for all the listings during the period 1975-1983. Each the listing was
checked in the Wall Street Journal Index for its cause, e.g. merger,
bankruptcy, liquidation, etc. The successful bidding firms for all acquired
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firms were then found, and mergers with bidding firms not listed on either
the NYSE or ASE were eliminated from the sample. The announcement date of
the bidding firms' merger attempt and the announced method of financing the
merger were collected from the Wall Street Journal Index. If any other event
(e.g. dividend increase, stock split, etc.) was simultaneously announced or
if the target firm was more than 50% owned by the bidder prior to the merger
announcement, the merger was eliminated from the sample. Finally, because of
data requirements, mergers where the bidding firm did not trade on the NYSE
or ASE for at least 100 days prior to the merger bid or did not trade on the
announcement day were also dropped from the sample.
A measure of merger size is required to test the effect of the size of
the merger on the bidding firm's returns. The measures used here are either
the market value ratio of the target's equity to the bidders' equity or the
announced value of the merger. The announced value of the merger is defined
as the market value of the target firm's equity. Market values one day after
the announcement day were used to make the size measure comparable across
merger bids. For some target firms the merger bid is not the first bid, for
others it is. This means that using a pre-bid measure of target size will
already include a merger premium for those targets previously bid on and not
for those with a first bid. Using a post-bid market value of target firms
includes a merger premium for all targets. This difference between first and
later bids is explored later in the paper.
Table 1 gives the distribution of merger announcement dates for the
sample of 343 completed mergers by year and announced form of financing.5
Table 2 presents data on the absolute and relative sizes of bidders and
targets by form of financing. The total number and average percentage of
merger announcements for each type of announced financing are given at the
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bottom of Table 1. Cash is the most frequently announced form of payment with
30% of the bids and common stock is the second most frequent form of known
payment with 19%.6 These percentages vary somewhat but remain fairly stable
in both percentage terms. and ranking during the period 1975-1983. Other
categories of announced financing include common stock and cash, common stock
and other (common stock and some other security and possibly cash),
convertible preferred or convertible preferred and cash, straight preferred
or straight preferred and cash, straight debt or straight debt and cash,
other (uncategorized combination of the above, e.g. convertible preferred and
debt, as well as different securities, e.g. convertible debt), and unknown
(the form of financing is not announced at the first mention of a merger bid
in the Wall Street Journal). All of these latter categories, except unknown,
represent small (10% or less) percentages of the total mergers.
4. Methodology
The stock market's reaction to merger bid announcements is measured
using daily excess stock returns and excess dollar returns. Excess stock
returns are taken from the Excess Returns file provided by the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). CRSP estimates the daily excess return
for any security by
XRit - Rit - E(Rit) (1)
where
t - day measured relative to the event,
XRit - excess return to security i for day t,
Rit - return on security i during day t,
E(Rit) - expected rate of return on security i for day t.
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E(Rit) is estimated by grouping annually all securities listed on the
NYSE and the AMEX into ten equal control portfolios ranked according to their
Scholes and Williams (1977) beta estimates. Each security is therefore
assigned to one of ten portfolios. The observed return to the control
portfolio to which security i is assigned is then used as the estimate of
E(Rit). The CRSP Daily Returns file provides the observed returns for each
security Rit. The excess return for each security, XRit, is then calculated
as the difference between the actual return to a security and the return to
its control portfolio.
Average excess returns for each relative day are calculated by
XRt_ 1 XRit (2)t Nil it,
where N is the number of securities with excess returns during day t. The
cumulative excess returns for each security i, CERi, are formed by summing
average excess returns over event time as follows:
CER iK, XR it, (3)i,K,L t=K XRit,
where the CERi,K,L is for the period from t=day K until tday L.
Average cumulative excess returns over the event time from day K until
day L are calculated by
CERK, CER (4)CEKL N il i,K,L
In particular, a two-day average excess return is generated for each
merger bid announcement examined. A two-day excess return is necessary to
capture the effect of an announcement due to its timing relative to the
market's trading hours. Day t-O is the day the news of an announcement is
published in the Wall Street Journal. In most cases, the news is announced
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on the previous day, t- -1, and reported the next day. If a merger bid is
announced before the market closes, then the market's response to the news
actually predates the publication by one day. If the news is announced after
the market closes, the market will respond on day 0. Thus in reality there
is a two-day announcement "day", t- -1 and t-O. This two-day return for firm
i is CERi -lO, where
CERi,_,,O
-
XRi,-+ XRi,O, (5)
and XRio0 is the excess return to security i on the day an announcement is
published in the Wall Street Journal.
Finally t-statistics are calculated for CERK,L by
t(CERK,L)-CERK L/S (CERK L), (6)
where S(CERK,L) is the portfolio standard deviation of CERK,L. This standard
deviation is calculated using several methods including an estimation period
variance and the cross-sectional variance.7
Excess dollar returns are calculated by
AMV - CERi,-, 0o MV (7)
where MVi is the equity market value of firm i.
For excess dollar returns the binomial sign test is performed on the
percentage negative with the null hypothesis of percentage < 0 - 50%.
5.1 Results for Bidders
Table 3 provides support for Hypothesis 1. The announced form of
financing affects the market's reaction to a merger bid, and bidders' returns
are lower for equity financed mergers. Announcement day excess returns and
excess dollar returns are presented there for 343 mergers. The market's
reaction is measured over two days; the day the announcement is reported in
the Wall Street Journal (t-O) and the day before (t--l) in case the news was
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released before the stock market closed that day. The two-day announcement
day excess return for all mergers is -0.85%, which is statistically
significant with a t-statistic of -8.42. This result is comparable to Dodd's
(1980) finding that the announcement day excess returns to bidding firms is -
1.16%. This result suggests that mergers are negative net present value
investments for bidding firms and that bidding firms stockholders lose. The
results do not, however, consider the possible impact of form of financing.
For the 102 bidders where the announced form of financing is all cash,
the average two-day announcement excess return is + 0.2%, although this
result is insignificantly different from zero (t=+l.05). In contrast,
bidders financing merger bids with common stock have negative average excess
returns of -2.4% which are statistically significant (t--11.60). The 2.6%
difference in excess returns between cash mergers and common stock mergers is
significant with a t-statistic of 9.25.
An interesting result is that bids financed with a combination of common
stock and cash result in an excess return of -1.47% which is between common
stock alone and cash alone and which is significantly different from both.
The difference in excess returns between cash alone and cash and stock is
1.67% which is significant with a t-statistic of 3.60. The -0.93% difference
between stock alone and cash and stock has a t-statistic of 1.98%.
The mean excess dollar returns and the percentages of two day returns
that are negative in Table 3 confirm the excess returns results. The average
excess dollar return is -$14.806 million for all bidding firms and almost 59%
of them have negative two day returns. This percentage is statistically
significant at the 1% level. However, the average bidder's excess dollar
returns for cash mergers is -$6.459 million and the percentage < 0 is almost
evenly split with 52% of the bidders experiencing negative excess returns.
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In contrast, bidders' excess dollar returns to common stock acquisitions are
predominantly negative with a two day average of -$26.931 million and 77%
below zero. This percentage is also statistically significant at the 1%
level. Thus, the average excess return, average excess dollar return and
distribution of returns are more negative for equity financed mergers than
for cash mergers. The differences in the excess dollar returns across forms
of financing also reflects the importance of looking at the size of the
investment. For example, the average excess dollar return for common stock
and other is -$84.5 million, which is three times the average for common
stock of -$26.9 million, while the average excess returns are -2.40% and -
3.57% respectively.
While we report results for all combinations of securities in the
tables,8 we focus the discussion primarily on the comparison of cash only and
common stock only merger financings. Interpretation of results for other
categories is complicated by the small sample sizes and by the fact that for
mergers involving a combination of securities, the proportions of the
securities are not usually known at announcement date. Finally, analysis of
pure cash offers and pure common stock offers provides the most direct
evidence on the hypotheses outlined in Section 2 of this paper.
Table 4 presents bidders' announcement day returns for first bids only
where return data is also available for the target firm. The rationale for
examining first bids concerns both investor anticipation of merger bids and
the need to compare bidder and target returns over the same time period.
When there is a prior bid outstanding for a target, investors speculate on
plausible potential bidders and may anticipate a subsequent bidder entering
the takeover bidding. In this case, a portion of the returns to subsequent
bidders may already be incorporated in the bidders' stock price at the
18
announcement of a subsequent bid. Examining returns to offers where there
are no prior bids outstanding should minimize the potential difficulties
associated with investor anticipation of bids and provide a clearer view of
returns to bidders. It is also necessary to use first bids if we are to
compare excess dollar returns for both bidder and targets over the same time
period.
The results in Table 4 are similar and somewhat stronger than those
reported in Table 3 for all bids. The bidder announcement day excess returns
are more positive when there is no prior bid for all forms of financing
except common stock only and debt. The excess returns are significantly
greater for all bids (t-3.68), cash bids (t-3.31), convertible preferred bids
(t=2.69) and unknown bids (t-4.11). Excess returns to common stock mergers
are still significantly negative, however, and still significantly different'
from the returns to cash mergers. Merger bids financed with a combination of
stock and cash again are associated with returns to bidders which are in
between the returns to bids financed with cash alone and common stock alone.
The differences between Tables 3 and 4 in excess dollar returns and
percentage negative are similar to those for excess returns.
For cash bids with no prior bids outstanding the bidders' average excess
return is +0.84% which is significant with a t-statistic of +2.67. The
average excess dollar returns are +7.857 million. Thus, cash only first bids
do produce positive and significant excess returns for bidders and positive
excess dollar returns. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
mergers are positive net present value investments. These positive returns to
merger bids are only visible when any negative impact of equity financing is
absent, and when the potential for investor anticipation of the bid is
minimized.
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Thus, the results in Tables 3 and 4 support Hypothesis 1. The form of
merger financing affects the returns to bidders, and common stock financed
bids produce significantly smaller excess returns. Bidders' returns for
common stock financed bids are significantly negative, while returns to cash
financed bids are positive, and for excess returns in first bids,
significant.
There is additional evidence on the effect of form of merger financing
on bidders. For 71 bids in Table 1 the form of financing is unknown at the
initial announcement date. Following these bids forward in time, it is
possible to identify the first mention of the form of financing to be used in
the merger and to calculate the market's reaction to the financing
announcement. Table 5 presents these returns for 63 bidders where there was
no other simultaneous information released with the financing announcement.
The results show that there is a negative market reaction to the use of
equity financing. The excess returns for both stock only and stock and other
are large, negative (-1.50% and -2.84%), and statistically significant. No
other form of financing has significant results at the 5% level. The
percentage negative for common stock is 61.5%, while the percentage negative
for cash is 50.0% The market reactions reported in Table 5 should reflect
only the new financing information since the merger parties, or investment
decision, was previously announced.9
Another factor which provides insight into bidders' returns is the
relative size of the target and bidder. As explained above, relative size may
be important in measuring excess returns, and absolute size may be important
in explaining excess dollar returns. Hypothesis 2b, postulates a positive
size effect for cash mergers and a negative size effect for common stock.
This finding for cash mergers would suggest that mergers are good investments
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and that this is measurable absent the negative financing effect associated
with issuing common stock. In the case for stock financed mergers, this
finding would suggest that the negative impact of equity financing dominates
any investment size effec.t.l °
Regression analysis is used to provide insight into the effects of
merger size and form of financing. Two day excess returns are cross-
sectionally regressed against the relative size of the merger by
XRETi - a + b SIZE i (8)
where
XRET - the two day announcement excess return to firm i.
SIZE - the relative size of the target firm, i.e. the equity
value of the target firm divided by the equity value of the
bidding firm.
Two day excess dollar returns are cross-sectionally regressed against
the absolute size of the merger by
XDRETi - a + b MERVALi (9)
where
XDRETi - the two day excess dollar return to firm i
MERVAL i - the announced value of merger i, i.e. the equity value of the
target firm.
Bidder firm regression coefficients and t-statistics from regressions
(8) and (9) are presented in Tables 6A and 6B for all mergers and for cash
only and common stock only mergers. Note that no size effect is apparent in
Table 6A for the excess return regression (8) over the full sample.
Specifying the form of financing is necessary to uncover the size effect in
this sample. For excess returns relative size has a positive but
insignificant coefficient for cash mergers, and a statistically significant
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negative coefficient at the 1% level in common stock mergers (t--2.91). For
regression (9) using excess dollar returns, absolute size is negative and
significant over the entire sample and also on the sample of common stock
only financed mergers. Absolute size has a positive and insignificant
coefficient for cash only mergers. Although not shown, none of the other
financing categories has any significant relationship between returns and
size except for common stock and cash which is significantly negative for
both excess returns and excess dollar returns.
To explore the structural differences in the regressions for cash and
common stock, t-statistics for the differences between the intercepts and the
coefficients are calculated. The difference in Table 6A between the
intercepts of the cash and the common stock regressions is not significant.
However, the difference in Table 6A between the size coefficients, bl, is
statistically significant (t-3.09). For Table 6B the results are similar. The
difference in the intercepts of the cash and common stock regressions is not
significant but the difference in the size coefficient, bl, is (t-1.96).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, that there is an interaction between
financing form and firm size, these results suggest that the relationship
between bidder excess returns and size is different for cash mergers and
those financed with equity. Chow tests, which test the null hypothesis that
the two regression structures are identical, confirm this. The F-statistics,
F(2,65), from the Chow tests between the cash and the common stock
regression is 11.67 in Table 6A and 4.97 in Table 6B, both of which are
significant at the 1% level.
Chow tests also reject, at the 1% level, that the regression structure
for mergers financed with a combination of cash and common stock is the same
as cash only mergers and they reject at the 5% level that cash and common
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stock has the same structure as common stock. This suggests that equity and
cash mergers should not be grouped when analyzing results. A discussion of
how much of each merger is to be financed by cash and how much is to be
financed by equity is essential to analyzing the returns properly.
Unfortunately, in most Wall Street Journal announcements the percentage of
cash used in multi-form financings is not specified.
Regressions with dummy coefficients provide additional insight into the
effects of merger size and form of financing on bidders' returns.ll The two
day excess return of the bidding firms are cross-sectionally regressed
against relative size and form of financing by
XRETi - a + b SIZEi . D + b2 SIZEi . D + b3 . Ds + b4 DT (10)
where Dc - a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if cash is the only
announced financing and 0 otherwise.
D, - a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if common stock
security is the announced form of financing and 0
otherwise.
DT a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bid is a tender
offer and 0 if it is not.
Two day excess dollar returns are cross-sectional regressed against
the value of the merger and form of financing by
XDRETi - a + b MERVALi Di + b2 MERVALi D +b3 · D + b4 DT (11)
Using cash only and common stock only as the two forms of financing in
equations (10) and (11), b measures the relationship between the firm's size
and the two day announcement return to the bidding firm for cash only
mergers. When the merger is to be financed with common stock, the term b2
measures the relationship between size and returns. The coefficient b3
estimates, independent of any size effect, the difference in the bidder's
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announcement day return when the announced form of financing is common stock.
The coefficient b4 estimates whether the use of tender offers, independent of
any size or financing effect, affects the bidder returns.
The results from regressions 10 and 11 for cash vs common stock are
presented in Tables 7A and 7B. The results demonstrate that both form of
financing and size are important explanatory variables in the market's
reaction to merger bids under both specifications. The results are
consistent with those reported in Table 6. For stock mergers the size
coefficient is negative and highly significant. Furthermore, the results show
that after correcting for size and form of financing, the form of offer,
tender or merger, is insignificant.
In summary, the examination of size effects presented in Tables 6 and 7
support Hypothesis 2b, the interaction of size effect and form of financing.
As seen in Table 4, cash mergers do produce positive returns for bidders, but
as seen in Tables 6 and 7 larger cash mergers do not produce larger returns
which are statistically significant. In contrast, there is a significant
negative size effect observed for equity financed merger bids. Thus, the
market's response to large mergers financed with common stock is similar to
its response to a large equity issue, and the negative impact of that
financing decision may dominate any positive investment value when returns
are measured.
5.2 Results for Targets
This study also examines the relationship between the form of merger
financing and announcement day excess returns for target firms. Hypothesis
3 postulates that stock financed mergers are associated with smaller observed
target returns. One rationale for this result is that stock financing allows
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target investors to postpone capital gains taxes. Cash mergers immediately
impose such taxes on target shareholders, and therefore cash bids require
higher target returns to offset this tax disadvantage. The opposite effect
would be consistent with the argument that risk arbitrageurs prefer cash as
a form of payment and are willing to accept lower returns as target
shareholders in cash mergers.
Table 8 presents the two-day announcement excess returns for the 157
target firms matched to the bidding firms in Table 4 by form of announced
financing. Only the reaction to first bids is reported since if a prior bid
is outstanding, the target firm's stock price already reflects the impacts
of that announcement at the time of a subsequent bid.12
The results in Table 8 demonstrate that targets' excess returns are
positive and statistically significant for all forms of merger financing. The'
excess dollar returns are also positive and the percentage negative is
significantly below 50% for all forms of financing. However, consistent with
Hypothesis 3, the average excess return associated with mergers financed with
common stock (13.85%) is substantially smaller than the average excess return
for cash mergers (27.47%). Pairwise t-tests show that this difference is
significant (t-20.86). These results are similar to those reported by Huang
and Walkling (1986) and Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983).
The results from regressions (10) and (11) where target returns are
substituted for bidder returns are presented in Table 9. The results in Table
9A, using relative size and excess returns, show that the size coefficient
for targets in stock mergers is large, negative, and significant. The size
coefficient in cash mergers, the form of financing coefficient, and the form
of offer coefficient are all much smaller and insignificant. These results
for target firms are similar in sign and significance to these for bidder
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firms in Table 7A. However, the constant term for targets in Table 9A is
large, positive and significant which is not true for bidders in Table 7A. In
contrast the target results in Table 9B, using absolute size and excess
dollar returns, are very different from bidder results in Table 7B and from
the target firm results in 9A. The size coefficients for both cash only and
stock only mergers are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Thus the larger the absolute size of the merger, the larger the excess
dollar returns of the target firm regardless of form of financing. The
constant is also positive and significant.
The difference between equity vs. cash is still maintained in Table 9B,
however. The size coefficient for equity mergers, +0.06, is much smaller than
the size coefficient for cash mergers, +0.15. Similar results are found in
regressions 8 and 9, (not reported in the Tables) which only use the size
variable and which are run separately on each form of financing. Using
relative size and excess returns, the coefficient on equity size is negative
and significant and the coefficient on cash size is positive and
insignificant. Using absolute size and excess dollar returns, both equity and
cash size coefficients are positive (+0.06 and +0.15 respectively) and both
are statistically significant (t-statisitcs of 3.78 and 2.88). A t-test on
the difference in these size coefficients is statistically significant
(+2.54) however and the Chow test significantly rejects, F(2,65) - 5.16, the
null hypothesis that the structure of the two regressions is the same.
Thus, the target results show that the excess returns and excess dollar
returns are both smaller for equity only mergers than for cash only mergers.
This result is related to the size of the merger, with excess returns being
negatively related to relative size for equity mergers, and excess dollar
returns being less positively related to absolute size for equity mergers
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than for cash mergers. These results are consistent with a tax effect for
target firm shareholders.
5.3 Results for Tenders vs. Merger Offers
This study also presents an analysis of tender offers compared with
merger bids. The objective is to determine if the observed difference in
excess returns reported in earlier studies between tenders and merger offers
can be explained by the form of financing effects documented above. The
results in Tables 7 and 9 indicate they are, since once the interaction of
size and form of financing is controlled for, the dummy variable for the form
of offer (i.e. tenders vs. merger) does not significantly affect the return.
Table 10 presents mean returns for bidder and targets by form of offer
and form of financing. Compared with merger offers, tender offers are
associated with larger excess returns for both bidders and targets. These
results are consistent with the findings of earlier studies. However, the
differences in returns for tender offers versus merger bids disappear once
the form of financing is considered. The reason is that a majority of the
tender offers are financed with cash and, as documented earlier, cash
financing is associated with larger returns for both bidders and targets.
While none of the tender offers were financed with common stock, roughly
twice as many merger offers were financed with stock as with cash. Again,
stock financing is associated with smaller returns to bidders and targets.
In Table 10A, bidding firms' excess returns are positive and
statistically significant in both cash tender offers (+1.21%, t-+1.94) and
cash merger offers (+0.91%, t-+3.08), but the pairwise t-statistics for the
difference between these mean returns (reported in Table 10C) is not
statistically significant. In contrast, the bidder excess returns for equity
mergers is negative and significant, (-2.58%, t--11.97). Thus, these results
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and those for the dummy coefficient on form of offer in Table 7 are
consistent with Hypothesis 4; the smaller bidder excess returns for merger
bids compared to tender offers is due to the negative impact of stock
financed merger offers.
In Table 10B target excess returns are actually larger for cash merger
offers (+28.77) than for cash tender offers (+24.58%). This difference is not
statistically significant using either a pairwise t-test or the dummy
coefficients in 9A and 9B. The larger target returns in the sample of all
tender offers (as compared to all merger offers) is explained by the smaller
target returns associated with stock financing (and other securities
financing) in merger offers.
Although these results are often drawn from small subsample sizes, they
are similar to those reported by Huang and Walking (1987) for target firm and
by Travlos (1989) and Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988)' for bidding firms. They
also support the hypothesis that the differences in returns observed for
tenders and merger offers can be explained by the form of financing.'3 It is
the prevalence of a particular form of financing that accounts for these
differences rather than any more fundamental aspect of tender offers versus
merger offers.
5.4 Results for the Merged Firm
The results for the merged firm are obtained by summing the excess
dollar returns for bidders and targets. This allows a direct measure of the
total market impact of the merger announcement. As seen above in Table 2, the
differing sizes of target and bidder sizes make addition of excess returns
impractical. Table 11 gives the total excess dollar return and the percentage
positive for each category. The mean excess dollar returns are positive and
the percentages significant for all categories of mergers except common stock
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and others. This indicates that most mergers generate real gains and do not
merely transfer wealth between target and bidder or between stockholder and
management.
For all mergers with matched targets and bidders, the average total
excess dollar return is $21.598 million. There are gains for 71.3% of the
sample and this percentage is significantly different from 50%. For cash
mergers, the total excess dollar return and, percentage positive is $33.168
million and 82.8%. The results for equity mergers once again demonstrate a
negative equity financing effect with an average excess dollar return for
equity of -$8.55 and only 40% of the equity total dollar returns being
positive. This percentage is significantly below 50%. These findings suggest
the hypothesis that, abstracting from the negative impact of equity
financings, mergers create value.
6. Conclusions
This study finds that the market's reaction to the announcement of a
merger bid is affected by the form of merger financing. Both the excess
returns and the excess dollar returns to bidding firms are smaller for equity
financed bids than for cash mergers. This is consistent with the finding of
earlier studies that equity financing has a negative announcement effect on
stock prices.
The negative impact associated with an equity financing decision is
absent in cash merger bids. Thus, cash bids may provide a clearer measure of
the investment value of a merger. For the full sample employed in this study,
cash bids are associated with positive, though not significant, excess
returns to bidders. For the subsample of merger bids when no prior bid has
been made (and the potential for investor anticipation is measured), bidding
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firms experience positive, significant excess returns and positive excess
dollar returns in cash financed mergers.
The relative size of the target and bidding firm is also important in
explaining bidders' merger returns, and the size effect is related to the
form of financing. Consistent with the findings of studies of equity issues,
a negative size effect is observed in equity financed mergers. The market
responds to equity financed mergers in a manner similar to its response to
equity offerings. Larger equity mergers are associated with larger negative
excess returns and with larger negative excess dollar returns to bidding
firms. While the investment value of the merger may still be positive, it is
not large enough to offset the negative impact of the financing decision to
issue equity. In contrast there is a positive, though insignificant, size
effect for cash financed mergers.
The form of merger financing is also important in explaining returns to
target firms. While the market's average response to a merger bid is always
positive for target firms, it is significantly more positive when the offer
is financed with cash rather than equity. This result is consistent with the
investor tax disadvantage associated with cash mergers.
In addition, the choice of whether a merger bid is initiated with a
tender offer or a merger offer does not appear important in explaining either
bidder or target returns after adjusting for the form of merger financing.
The larger returns observed for both bidders and targets in tender offers are
explained by the prevalence of cash tender offers. Consistent with the
financing effects described above, the more frequent use of stock financing
in merger offers results in smaller returns for both bidders and targets.
Finally the total return for mergers obtained by adding the excess
dollar returns for both bidder and targets indicate that, on average, mergers
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create value. For the sample of all mergers and for all categories of
financing except equity or equity and other the mean total return is positive
and the percentage of total returns that are positive is significant.
These results suggest strongly that the announcement of a merger bid
releases two simultaneous pieces of information to the market; the value of
the merger as an investment and the decision by the bidding firm concerning
how to finance the merger. Measuring the market's reaction to a merger bid
not only measures the estimated present value of the merger investment
decision but also the market's reaction to a financing decision. This is not
surprising in light of recent work, but it complicates our ability to
evaluate whether or not mergers are good for shareholders. This complication
and the corresponding necessity to consider both the form of financing and
the use of funds should probably be extended to the analysis of all'
investments and financing decisions.
III
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FOOTNOTES
1. Shipper and Thompson also find significantly negative abnormal returns
to acquiring firms associated with certain regulatory changes which make
future acquisition activity more difficult. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins
also find that bidding firms' shareholders do worse after 1969 and the
passage of the Williams Act and that target firm shareholders do better
after that date.
2. In addition, You, Caves, Henry, and Smith (1986) include form of payment
as one of several factors in explaining the returns to bidder and target
firms in mergers. They find that a dummy variable for cash merger is
positive and the only consistently statistically significant explanatory
variable.
3. There is the possibility that using cash may be interpreted as a
positive signal of the firm's cash flow (see Miller and Rock (1986) for
an example of this argument). In that case the positive information
effect from using cash may cause the measured effect to overstate the
value of the merger as an investment.
4. Capital gains taxes are not eliminated only postponed. The true savings
to shareholders is the ability to earn additional returns on the
postponed tax payment. The bidder is not universally better off by
paying less with equity. The 'write-up' of assets and thus the
depreciation allowed the bidder is usually higher in a taxable, i.e.,
cash merger. Thus the bidder may be better off if the market value
exceeds the book value by a sufficient amount.
5. The time period reported for merger announcements is 1973-1983, while
the data base was developed from the list of NYSE and ASE delistings for
the period 1975-1983. The announcement dates cover a longer time period
since the announcement date takes place before the delisting date. This
means that the distribution of mergers reported in Table 1 is not
necessarily a complete sample of announcement dates for 1973-1983 but do
represent a complete set of delistments (which meet the criteria
discussed above) for the period 1975-1983.
6. Huang and Walking report, for the period April 1977-September 1982, that
cash is the most frequent form of financing offered (49.5%) and equity
second (15.7%). Franks, Harris and Mayer find, for the period 1975-
1984, that cash is the most frequent form of financing with 54.1% and
equity is second with 23.7%. Travlos over the period 1972-1981 reports
35.9% equity offers and 59.9% cash offers. Surprisingly he only
classifies one other type of financing, cash and stock, which
constitutes 4.2% of his sample.
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7. Differences in the choice of a test statistic do not make any important
difference in the results presented here. The estimation period
variance was estimated over the period from 69 days before the
announcement day until 21 days before the announcement day. It was
estimated both with and without a covariance term for consecutive daily
excess returns to test for possible first-order autocorrelation. None
was found. The t-statistics were generally higher when the variance was
calculated from the estimation period t-69 to t-21 then when it was
calculated from the cross sectional period. This is the expected result
if the event period involves an increase in variance. The t-statistics
reported in the tables and text are all calculated using the estimation
period variance. Any differences in significance levels between these
and the cross-sectional t-statistics will be noted.
8. There is one other category of common stock financing with four
observations. This is when two current companies exchange their stock
for the stock of the new firm. They are included under "Other" in the
classification scheme above. The bidding firm in these cases was
defined as the firm whose shareholders received a majority of the voting
stock in the new combined firm. The average excess return for bidders
is -0.63% with a t-statistic of -0.82. The average announcement day
excess return of the four firms defined as targets was +4.71% (t-+4.49).
9. Even this may be understated because of investor anticipation. Since
these are all public firms, the market evaluates whether the firm has
the necessary cash or debt capacity to finance the acquisition or
whether it must issue equity instead.
10. It can be argued that cash mergers may also be financed externally prior
to the merger bid. This should pose no problem however, since the two
dates separate the market's reactions to the financing and investment
decisions.
11. This test assumes that the variance of the error terms is the same for
acquisitions financed by cash and securities. The Chow tests allow
the error variance to differ for cash mergers and securities mergers.
12. The two day announcement excess returns for target firms who had a prior
bid is also examined. The announcement day used is the day the
successful bidder in our sample is first identified. The excess return
for this sample of follow up bids was a positive 13.81% and
statistically significant but lower than the 18.04% for the sample of
first bids. This difference in announcement day excess returns is
significant with a t-statistic equal to 11.61. Furthermore, the excess
returns for prior bids was significantly positive but smaller than the
corresponding sub-sample of first bids over all forms of financing
except "other and "stock and other". These two were also positive and
significant, but not smaller than the first bids. These results are to
be expected since the market would have already reacted to the first bid
11
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and subsequent bids would merely reevaluate the merger's probability,
the expected form of financing, and the expected price.
13. The results when prior bids are included are consistent and in some ways
stronger. With cash financing both bidders and targets-have higher
returns for merger offers than for tender offers. This is of course
opposite to the results usually reported in the literature when form of
financing is not considered.
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Table 6
Estimated coefficients and t-statistics from regressing the two-day
announcement return for bidding firms on the size of target firm.
6A: Bidder Excess Returns Regressed Against Relative Size Using
XRETi = a + b SIZE i.
Form of Financing .a b1 N R2 F
All -.95 +1.14 157 .008 2.25
(-2.09) (+1.50)
Cash +0.28 +1.89 29 .003 1.08
(+0.33) (+1.04)
Common Stock -0.67 -13.81*** 40 .160 8.44
(-0.81) (-2.91)
6B: Bidder Excess Dollar Returns Regressed Against Absolute Size Using
XDRETi = a + b MERVAL i.
Form of Financing a b1 N R2 F
All +1.281 -0.058*** 157 .068 12.32
(0.232) (-3.51)
Cash +5.676 +0.024 29 .028 0.23
(+0.53) (+0.48)
Common Stock -13.876 -0.093*** 40 .156 8.21
(-1.46) (-2.87)
t-statistics are in parentheses
XRET - the two day announcement excess return to bidder i.
SIZE i - the relative size of the target firm, i.e. the equity value of the
target firm divided by the equity value of the target.
XDRETi - the two day excess dollar return to bidder i.
MERVALi - the announced value of the merger, i.e. the value of the target
firm.
*** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 11
Total excess dollar returns in millions of dollars by announced
form of financing in the period 1973-1983 when
the first bidder was also the eventual successful bidder
Form of Mean Excess N Form of Mean Excess N
Financing Dollar Return Financing Dollar Return
($ millions) ($ millions)
(% > 0) (% > 0)
All 21.598 157 CONV. PFD. 37.321 15
(71.3%) (100.0%)
CASH 33.168 29 PFD 82.909 2
(82.8%) (100.0%)
COMMON STOCK -8.55 40 DEBT 7.988 5
(40.0%) (60.0%)
COMMON STOCK
& CASH +46.57 11 OTHER 16.186 14
(81.8%) (78.6%)
COMMON STOCK
& OTHER -61.247 6 UNKNOWN 46.687 35
(50.0%) (82.9%)
